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**IN THE  
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA**

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SIMS BLEDSOE,	)	
	)	
Appellant-Defendant,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 49A02-0611-CR-1036
	)	
STATE OF INDIANA,	)	
	)	
Appellee-Plaintiff.	)	

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APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT  
The Honorable David Lewis, Judge Pro Tempore  
Cause No. 49G10-0410-FD-135761

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**August 17, 2007**

**MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**KIRSCH, Judge**

Sims Bledsoe was convicted of resisting law enforcement<sup>1</sup> as a Class A misdemeanor after a bench trial. He appeals raising the following issue: whether there was sufficient evidence presented that he “knowingly” or “intentionally” fled from law enforcement.

We affirm.

### **FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On July 24, 2006, following a 911 call, Indianapolis Police officers were dispatched to a residence in Marion County. During the 911 call, the dispatcher heard a female screaming in the background. Officer Susan Feeley approached and knocked several times on the door to the residence while Officer Ronald Wells and other officers stood behind. Eventually, Bledsoe answered the door and according to the officers was breathing heavily and appeared agitated. Bledsoe told Officer Feeley that the 911 call had been a mistake and they were not needed. Officer Feeley asked if there was a woman in the house, and Bledsoe responded that he was alone. Then Officer Feeley noticed a female standing behind Bledsoe, and Bledsoe stated “she’s okay” and slammed the door. *Tr.* at 9.

Officer Feeley again knocked on the door and told Bledsoe when he answered that she needed to speak with the female behind him. Bledsoe again said she was okay and that the officers did not have a right to be at the house. The female attempted to leave the house, and Bledsoe tried to block her exit with his arms and body. Bledsoe eventually let the female pass. The officers identified the female as Bledsoe’s girlfriend, Sharon Armour. Officer Feeley spoke with Armour on the sidewalk in front of the residence.

At that time, Officer Wells asked Bledsoe, who was standing in his doorway, for his

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<sup>1</sup> See IC 35-44-3-3.

identification. Bledsoe told Officer Wells that it was inside and he needed to get it. As Bledsoe turned, Officer Wells instructed Bledsoe three times, in quick succession, not to enter the residence and not to close the front door. Bledsoe entered the residence, shut the door, and locked the deadbolt. Officer Wells immediately pounded on the door demanding Bledsoe open the door. When no response came, Officer Wells kicked the door in and noticed Bledsoe walking away from him. Officer Wells grabbed Bledsoe, took him to the front porch, and handcuffed him. Bledsoe admitted to Officer Wells that he was on house arrest.

The State charged Bledsoe with criminal confinement and resisting law enforcement. After a bench trial, the State dismissed the criminal confinement charge, and the trial court found Bledsoe guilty of resisting law enforcement. Bledsoe now appeals.

### **DISCUSSION AND DECISION**

When we review a claim that a conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence establishing the defendant's guilt, we may not reweigh the evidence or question the credibility of witnesses. *Bonner v. State*, 789 N.E.2d 491, 492 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We must affirm a conviction if the finder of fact heard evidence of probative value from which it could have inferred the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* When making this determination, we consider only the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, favorable to the verdict. *Id.*

Bledsoe argues that the State failed to prove that he “knowingly” or “intentionally” resisted, in this case, fled, from the police. To convict Bledsoe of resisting law enforcement, the State was required to prove Bledsoe “knowingly or intentionally: (3) fle[d] from a law

enforcement officer after the officer ha[d], by visible or audible means, . . . , identified himself or herself and ordered [him] to stop, . . .” IC 35-44-3-3(3). “Flight,” as used in the statute, means a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place once there. *Wellman v. State*, 703 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “Flight from justice” means:

“removing one’s self from or secreting one’s self within jurisdiction wherein offense was committed to avoid arrest; or concealing one’s self therein; with intent, in either case, to avoid arrest, detention, or punishment for some criminal offense.”

*Id.* (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 639 (6th 1990)).

In *Wellman*, an officer approached the defendant, and after the defendant refused to cooperate in their child abuse investigation, the defendant quickly went inside, locked the door, and held the door shut. 703 N.E.2d at 1063. This evidence was sufficient to prove resisting law enforcement where it indicated the defendant clearly disobeyed a command to stop and continued to resist. *Id.*

Here, when Officer Wells asked Bledsoe for his identification, Bledsoe responded he needed to go inside the residence to get it. At that time, Officer Wells audibly ordered Bledsoe to stop and not enter the residence. Notwithstanding the law enforcement officer’s order, Bledsoe entered the residence, and shut and locked the door. As in *Wellman*, the evidence is sufficient to support Bledsoe’s conviction for resisting law enforcement.

Affirmed.

DARDEN, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur